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ABSTRACT: In the last days of the electoral campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, 
on Thursday March 11th 2004, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 
persons in commuting trains in the capital Madrid. Four days later, the opposition party won the 
election, against all predictions that were made prior to the terror attacks. This change in 
expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques to test 
some politico-economic hypotheses. The quantitative exercise is carried out employing 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Hypothesis testing is improved by means of 
bootstrapping techniques. Convergence theories prove quite resilient as, jointly, quoted firms 
were not significantly affected by the election outcome. The results on the impact on particular 
companies and industries, however, suggest that a combination of capture and agency problems 
may play a role in explaining the effects of the change in expectations.  
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RESUMEN: El jueves 11 de marzo de 2004, durante los últimos días de la campaña electoral 
para las elecciones generales en España, una  serie de atentados terroristas causó la muerte de 
191 personas en  trenes de cercanías en Madrid. Cuatro días después, el partido hasta entonces 
en la oposición, el PSOE, ganó las elecciones, en contra de cualquier predicción o sondeo 
realizado con anterioridad a los atentados. Este cambio de expectativas presenta una 
oportunidad única para emplear técnicas de ‘estudio de acontecimiento’ para estudiar hipótesis 
político-económicas. El ejercicio cuantitativo es llevado a cabo mediante regresiones 
aparentemente no relacionadas (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions o SUR), mientras que el test 
de hipótesis es ajustado mediante técnicas de bootstrap. Las teorías de convergencia se 
comprueban bastante resistentes ya que conjuntamente las empresas cotizadas en el mercado de 
valores no fueron afectadas por el resultado electoral. Sin embargo, el resultado sobre el 
impacto en determinadas empresas e industrias sugiere que una combinación de problemas de 
captura y agencia puede jugar un rol importante en explicar los efectos del cambio de 
expectativas. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In the last days of the campaign for the 2004 general election in Spain, on Thursday March 11th 
20041, a series of simultaneous terror attacks caused the death of 191 persons in commuting 
trains in Madrid. The attacks themselves, according to some, or a deliberate attempt by the 
incumbent government to hide information about the attacks for electoral reasons in the short 
period of time between the attacks and the election, according to others, are held responsible for 
the surprise victory of the Socialist opposition in the election on the next Sunday. This change 
in expectations presents a unique opportunity to take advantage of event study techniques2 and 
use the natural experiment to test some economic and politico-economic hypotheses. One of the 
problems of many event studies is that long event windows run the risk of including effects of 
events other than those under analysis; the fact that in this case the election result could not have 
been predicted four days before the election greatly reduces the meaningful length of the event 
window and hence the potential for event contamination, except for the potential confusion 
between the attacks themselves and political change, something we deal with in Section 5. 
 
The Median Voter Theorem3 predicts that if two vote-maximizing parties compete in a single 
political dimension, and voter preferences are single peaked, then both parties converge 
presenting the platform that best suits the median voter. The theorem, an application by Downs 
(1957) of the Hotelling (1929) location model, tries to explain the strong forces towards 
convergence to the centre of the ideological spectrum that are observed in politics. The median 
voter theorem has been used in many applications in economics and has become one of the 
workhorse models of the literature on political economy (see Persson and Tabbellini, 2000). 
However, many authors have pointed out that there is evidence that political parties often differ 
in some important policy dimensions, so that politics would be partisan4 instead of convergent; 
Roemer (2001) wonders why would a group of citizens bother to undertake the costs of creating 
a political party if they end up implementing the same policies as their main rival. Which of 
both theories does evidence support? This question may have different answers depending on 
time and place. We test it for one country and place were, according to political rhetoric, one 
would expect to find high divergence: Spain in 2004. In the months prior to the election, Prime 
Minister Aznar had supported U.S. President Bush on the Irak war, for example, a move that 
                                                 
1 Electoral campaigns in Spain usually end on Friday, and Saturday is “reflection day.” Vote is on 
Sunday. 
 
2 See Binder (1985, 1988), Mackinlay (1997) and Khotari and Warner (2007). 
 
3 See Downs (1957). 
 
4 See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). 
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 was strongly criticized by the opposition. Socialist candidate José Luis R. Zapatero was 
according to some commentators to the left of previous socialist leader Felipe González. It was 
also a period of increasing polarization in many countries (including the US) between the main 
political parties. Being Spain a member of the European Union in the Euro area, however, 
implies that the forces of convergence (at least in macroeconomic policies) are also strong, as 
the European Union establishes very strict norms of fiscal policy and controls monetary policy 
through the European Central Bank. Whether convergence or partisan forces are stronger is 
ultimately an empirical question. 
 
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of elections on shareholder’s expectations, and we 
contribute to this literature. For example, Roberts (1990), Shum (1995), Herron et al. (1999), 
Herron (2000), Pantzalis et al. (2000), Vuchelen (2003), Jensen and Schmith (2005), Leblang 
and Mukherjee (2005), Füss and Bechtel (2006) and Jayachandran (2006) find different degrees 
of convergence depending on time and country. Like Jayachandran (2006) we analyze the effect 
of a surprise political event. But we do it with econometric techniques that improve the 
reliability of significance tests, such as the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions method and 
bootstrapping. 
 
We find that, in spite of surrounding political rhetoric, investors on the largest Spanish firms 
jointly considered did not expect significant differences between both major Spanish political 
parties. The expectation was that the degree of convergence in policies affecting firms’ profits 
would be high, at least at the macro level. In addition to testing convergence versus partisan 
theories, we reach the conclusion that the hypothesis of capture of politicians, in itself and 
combined with agency problems in privatized firms with dispersed shareholdings, is not rejected 
by the data. This is revealed by examining the stock price reaction of individual companies or 
groups of companies (a micro level analysis) to the surprise election result. 
 
In the rest of this paper, in Section 2 we provide some background on the events of interest, 
methodological issues and the hypotheses. In Section 3, we test convergence versus partisan 
theories looking at the joint reaction of stock prices to the surprise election result. In Section 4, 
we test some other theories that involve firm value expectations, such as capture and agency 
theories. Section 5 introduces some notes on the effects of the terror attacks. Finally, Section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Background 
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2.1. The events 
 
On Thursday March 11th 2004, a major terrorist attack killed 191 persons in commuting trains in 
Madrid, the Spanish capital. On Sunday March 14th 2004, the Socialist Party (PSOE) won the 
general election by a large though not overall majority (see Figure 1), beating all expectations as 
reported by electoral polls.  
 
The special circumstances surrounding the Spanish Election made its final outcome completely 
unpredictable four days prior to the election,5 because it was then that the terrorist attacks of 
March 11th 2004 in Madrid occurred, killing 191 persons. Until that day, the ruling Popular 
Party (PP) had led the polls by 2 to 7 points, according to different poll sources (such as 
newspapers El Pais, El Mundo, ABC). According to a poll performed after the election by an 
official body in Spain (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas -C.I.S6.), 21.5% of voters 
declared being influenced by the terrorist attacks in their voting decision.7 More interestingly, 
9.4% of voters voted for PSOE only because of the terrorist attacks, while only 1.5% of voters 
voted PP because of the very same reason. It is clarifying to see that the difference between 
these two values is 7.9%. As the final results gave a 5 point advantage to PSOE, it leaves the 
results, discounting the effect of the terrorist attack on voters’ decisions, in a 2.9 point lead by 
the PP, which is roughly consistent with poll results prior to the attacks. Therefore, stock returns 
immediately after the election must incorporate (if the semi-strong version of the financial 
markets efficiency hypothesis holds8) the returns caused by an unexpected political change. If 
any company’s or industry’s profit was contingent on the political outcome of the elections, 
their valuation must have significantly changed after the election, as the results were not 
expected. 
 
                                                 
5 The poll that gave the incumbent Popular Party (PP) the narrowest advantage among all published polls 
over the Socialist Party (PSOE) was published in newspaper La Vanguardia seven days before election 
day (polls cannot be made public by law in Spain after five days before election day, and the last ones are 
usually published seven days before, on the previous Sunday). According to this poll, PP was at that time 
two percentage points ahead of PSOE. 
 
6 Estudio Postelectoral del CIS, Marzo-Abril 2004. 
 
7 See next paragraph for a discussion on whether the influence in the voting decision was either for the 
terrorist attacks themselves or by the way the Government managed the reaction to such attacks. 
 
8 According to this version of the hypothesis, stock prices summarize all publicly available information 
about a particular stock. Then, only new information affects stock prices. 
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 Interpretations of why the terrorist attacks had such an importance in the results have been 
largely discussed. A stream of opinion seems to think that the attacks confirmed the general 
opinion in Spain that the PP Government’s decision to get involved in Iraq’s war was a mistake. 
Opinion polls showed that almost 85% of Spaniards opposed the war in Iraq. Others argue that 
the main cause of the fall of the incumbent party were not the terrorist attacks themselves, but 
the way of managing the crisis by the government. When the attacks happened in the morning 
of Thursday 11th of March 2004 (see Table 1), the first reaction from many analysts and 
politicians was to blame ETA, the Basque Separatist terrorist group and usual perpetrator of 
terrorist attacks in Spain since the 1960s.9 Nevertheless, soon the evidence pointed to Al-Qaeda. 
Later the very same day of the attacks, most international media were concluding that the 
attacks had been perpetrated by Islamist Terrorist Groups. Yet the PP’s Government kept on 
blaming ETA for the next four days, until the Election Day (see Table 1). Some commentators 
suggested that the PP feared losing the election because the public would realize that Islamist 
groups targeted Spain as a result of the Spanish government’s support of the Irak war. In 
addition, the PP focused its pre-election message on the fight against ETA and on the influence 
of ETA’s separatist objectives on nationalist forces in the periphery willing to support a new 
Socialist government. Therefore, following this line of reasoning, if they could hold for three 
days until the election blaming ETA, this would reinforce their campaign message. The problem 
to some was that it became obvious to them that the Government was not really interested in 
transparently investigating the attacks, which had a large emotional impact on public opinion, 
but only in re-election.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003). 
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 Table 1. From March 11 to March 14 
07:47 Four trains in Madrid are simultaneously bombed. 191 persons are killed and over 1500 are injured 
13:00 The incumbent president J.M. Aznar reports that ETA is behind the attacks 
15:50 The Government leaks a file from the Spanish Intelligence Service pointing to ETA as the most likely perpetrator of the attacks 
20:20 
A. Acebes, Minister of the Home Office at that moment, informs of the 
finding of a tape in Arabic in a suspicious van, but keeps the hypothesis 
of ETA as the most likely 
Th
ur
sd
ay
 1
1t
h 
21:30 The Islamic group Abu Hafs Al Masri claims they authored the attacks 
18:00 A.Acebes repeats that ETA is the main hypothesis that the police is pursuing 
Fr
id
ay
 1
2t
h 
18:30 ETA claims it had nothing to do with the attacks 
16:00 Three Moroccan and two Indian men are arrested by the Spanish police
19:00 Demonstrators gather in front of PP headquarters in all major Spanish cities, asking for a clear information policy on the authors of the attacks 
S
at
ur
da
y 
13
th
 
20:30 A.P. Rubalcaba, a former Cabinet Minister and member of PSOE's direction, strongly criticizes the role of the Government 
S
un
da
y 
14
th
 
20:00 The election day reaches its end. PSOE win the election 
Sources: El Mundo, El País 
 
Being the cause of the change in citizen preferences one thing or another, the fact is that the 
actual results of the election were not the ones anticipated by the market until the attacks 
occurred. If any company’s or industry’s profit depended on the political outcome of the 
election, their stock valuations must have significantly changed between Thursday 11th in the 
morning and the opening of the stock market on Monday 15th, the day after the election and 
after the week-end break in the stock market. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
 
We carry out an analysis of the effects in the financial markets of the political change in the 
March 2004 election in Spain. Based on the semi-strong version of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), if the political change had any effect on the discounted expected future 
6
 stream of profits of quoted companies, the markets would have reacted to the new information 
accordingly. The special circumstances surrounding this election make this occasion a unique 
opportunity to test for effects of political change on the performance of companies, groups of 
companies, and the market as a whole.  
 
The classical abnormal returns computation is not suitable for analysing the effects of an event 
that affects a group of companies at the same moment of time. When there is event clustering10 
the covariance amongst returns will not be zero, and the asymptotic results of normality no 
longer hold. An alternative approach which solves this problem is proposed by Binder (1985).  
He disaggregates the portfolio into a multivariate regression system of returns equations, with 
one equation for each of the firms experiencing the events: 
 
(1) ∑
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where ni ......1=  are the number of companies we include;  itR  are company i’s stock 
returns11; mtR  are the stock market index returns; atD  is a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 on the days of the events of interest and zero otherwise; iα , iβ , and iaγ  are parameters to be 
estimated; and we allow the error terms ),...,,...,,...,,,...,( 1221111 ntntt εεεεεε to be 
heteroskedastic across firms but non-correlated across time. 
                                                 
10 Events affecting different firms occur at the same moment of time. 
 
11 Daily returns can be obtained in the usual fashion 
1
11
1 −=−=
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PP
r  
where tP stands for prices at time t. Nevertheless, we use the logarithmic transformation 
)ln()ln( 1−−= ttt PPR  
where )1ln( += tt rR , which yields almost identical results, yet a more symmetric distribution, which is 
clearly convenient for the sake of the analysis as it is far easier to derive the time-series properties of 
additive processes (such as the natural logarithmic transformation) than of multiplicative processes. 
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 We estimate the model either using the Ibex-35 index of the Madrid stock exchange (M1) or  a 
constant mean return model (M2). The constant mean return model implies that, from the 
previous equations, we remove mti Rβ . This structure allows the coefficients to differ across 
firms. This system is an application of the seemingly unrelated regression methodology, SUR 
(Chang and Lee, 1977).12 Testing individual hypotheses is not a problem, as t-tests are 
available and consistently test hypotheses in the SUR framework. This multivariate regression 
model assumes that the disturbances are uncorrelated within each equation but allows for the 
errors to be contemporaneously correlated across equations. It also presents a number of 
advantages compared to more standard regression models generally used in event studies. First, 
it can test joint hypotheses (using the Wald test for instance) while other approaches only test 
for average effects. Secondly, this very same fact allows the coefficients not to cancel out with 
each other when they have different signs (i.e. if we want to test the joint effect of an event that 
causes both positive and negative effects in the different firms tested, by using an averaged time 
series we would conclude there is no effect as those might cancel out while by this method we 
would indeed find these effects as long as they are statistically significant). Finally, SUR 
regression allows testing event windows of a reduced length consistently by multiplying the 
length of the window across firms. 
 
In joint hypotheses Wald tests are available for this type of equations but are only valid 
asymptotically. In small samples, these tests are biased against the null and tend to over-reject. 
This implies that if the null hypothesis is not rejected, the evidence is very strong against the 
null. We need only to be cautious in the case that the null is rejected. Chou (2004) proposes 
bootstrap methods to sort the problem out. Using Monte Carlo simulations, he shows that 
bootstrapping the sample provides p-values very close to the nominal size of the test. The 
bootstrap method (Effron, 1979) is a computationally intensive method that allows computing 
the distribution of a test statistic by re-sampling the data13. Horowitz (2001) shows that critical 
values obtained from this method are always at least as accurate as standard asymptotic theory. 
We propose the following procedure: first, estimate with SUR; second, test the hypothesis when 
necessary with the Wald test, and in the case a null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level, 
bootstrap the test to obtain the p-values by re-sampling a certain number of times. The bootstrap 
                                                 
12 This methodology is also used in a study of financial market perspectives of political expectations by 
Roberts (1990), without using the bootstrap technique, as we do, to improve the reliability of significance 
tests. 
 
13 Sampling from the original sample. The idea underlying bootstrap is that we pretend that the sample is 
the population. Thus, we obtain bootstrap samples by sampling from the (original) sample. And this gives 
a consistent estimation of the distribution of a test statistic. 
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 method applied to the Wald test in a SUR framework can be done in the following steps (Chou, 
2004): 
 
1. Estimate the model by Ordinary Least Squares and obtain the residuals ( Tεεε ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ 21 ) 
and the parameters corresponding to the different alphas, betas and gammas. Calculate 
the Wald test. 
2. Estimate the model by Ordinary Least Squares without the observations corresponding 
to the event window and obtain the parameters of the model and the residuals 
( ),...,ˆ,ˆ,...,ˆ,ˆ
2121 TTT
εεεεε , where the event window comprises observations between 1T  
and 2T . 
3. Repeat a large number of times, say 1000 times, the following steps: 
a) Draw a bootstrap sample *tε  from the residuals in 2. Compute the values of 
( nttt RRR ,...,, 21 ) using the parameters from 2 and the bootstrapped 
residuals *tε . Call the resulting values ( **2*1 ,...,, nttt RRR ).  
b) Estimate with OLS using the original independent variables data and the 
bootstrapped dependent variable data ( **2
*
1 ,...,, nttt RRR ). Calculate the Wald test 
and call it *τ . 
4. Calculate the percentage of *τ ’s that are greater than the Wald statistic computed in 1, 
which gives the bootstrap p-value of the test. 
 
In this way, one can obtain reliable joint tests for the hypotheses of interest. These joint tests can 
be either for all the companies in the sample (Section 3) or for groups of them (Section 4). We 
use daily returns data for Spanish companies in Madrid’s Continuous Market (MCM) Stock 
Exchange from Infomercados, a financial web site specialized in Spanish equity markets.  
 
We estimate the model for a sample of companies in the MCM Stock Exchange. 125 companies 
were originally included in the data set. However, only 87 companies were finally included in 
the estimation. The 38 remaining companies were excluded because of either thin trading or 
incomplete data. The estimation period ranges from May 2003 to December 2004, therefore 
having a pre-event window from May 2003 to March 2004, and a post-event window from 
March 2004 to December 2004.  
 
Two event windows are included in the estimation. First, a two-day event window for the 
terrorist attacks. It includes the day of the events, 11th of March, and the day after it, Friday the 
9
 12th. In this case the news of the terrorist attacks could not have been discounted, and therefore 
it does not make any sense to include the day before the event. There are two reasons for 
including this event window. In the first place, the attacks might have had an effect on the stock 
markets by themselves. Secondly, as they were the indirect cause for the change in the election 
results, economic agents might have partially discounted when the attacks happened that the PP 
was going to lose the election, or more seemingly, that the probabilities of the PSOE to win the 
election increased. 
 
The second event window we estimate corresponds to the impact of the Spanish general election 
results in Spain. A three-day event window, which is usually the window length chosen for 
general event studies with daily data, is not necessarily the best way to estimate in this case. 
Because the effects of a change in a government are of a higher and deeper importance than 
particular events affecting a firm, it might take some more days for the agents to fully 
understand to its whole extend the nature of the change. That is why we prefer a five-day event 
window instead. In order to ensure the robustness of the results, we roll back and forward the 
window presenting results for groups of companies for each model with 4, 5 and 6 days 
(meaning returns from March 15th to 18th, 15th to 19th and 15th to 22nd). In Section 3, we also test 
for the joint significance of the attacks plus the election as if they were a single event and we do 
this for windows between the day of the attacks and the next Monday (3 working days), 
Tuesday (4 days) and so on until Monday of the following week (8 days). 
 
Once the Wald test is computed, we proceed to compute the bootstrapped p-values in those 
cases where the null hypothesis has been rejected. Due to the fact that this method is very 
computationally-intensive, if the hypothesis is rejected in all event windows, we bootstrap only 
for the 5-day event window as in Table 2. 
 
2.3.  Hypotheses 
 
We test a number of hypotheses related to the political economy literature (see for example 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000): the partisan theory at the macro level; the partisan theory at the 
micro level; the capture theory of policy makers; and the theory of collusion between politicians 
and managers combined with the agency theory of a conflict of interest inside firms and in the 
political arena. 
 
• Macro-level partisan theory. According to this theory, political parties represent different 
constituencies with different interests. Due to political transaction costs, issues need to be 
aggregated in a few dimensions, and political parties differ in these broad dimensions. This is 
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 reflected for example in different macroeconomic policies. Historically, the macro-economic 
differences that were postulated assumed the existence of a trade-off between unemployment 
and inflation, left parties being more pro-employment and right parties being more anti-inflation 
(Hibbs, 1977). More modernly, these macro-policies were assumed to take the form of left 
parties being more pro-public investment and pro-welfare state and right parties being more pro-
market, pro-tax reductions or pro-supply side policies, depending on the interpretation or 
emphasis (see Boix, 1996).  If a higher inflation and a higher public deficit lead to increasing 
interest rates, this has a negative impact in general on firms’ profits, and we should expect a 
higher probability of left-wing policies being implemented causing lower stock valuations in 
general. 
 
• Micro-level partisan theory.  Some authors, such as Herron et al. (1999), claim that macro-
level policies may hide partisan differences at the micro-level. Even if public deficits or 
inflation end up being very similar under right or left governments, differences in defence 
policies, environmental issues or other policies affecting particular industries may be 
significantly different. For example, using data for the 1992 US election, Herron et al. (1999) 
show that 15 out of 74 sectors (20%) had a stock price performance which denoted that 
investors in these sectors were not indifferent between presidential candidates. In Spain in the 
first years of the XXI Century, one important specific industry was subject to important policy 
controversies: the electricity industry. This industry was experiencing a takeover wave all over 
Europe as a result of the liberalization of energy at the European Union level. As a result, all 
major Spanish electricity firms were actors in the market for corporate control, either as targets 
or acquirers. The two main political parties in Spain approached the issue with the objective of 
keeping Spanish firms under Spanish owners, but whereas the Popular Party tried to do this 
between 1996 and 2004 by trying to stop any takeover and any subsequent reduction in the 
number of firms, the Socialist party hinted during the 2004 electoral campaign that it would not 
block mergers between Spanish firms (see Trillas, 2006). 
 
• Capture: groups of citizens may overcome free-riding problems and organize in lobbies or 
interest groups to influence the policy choices of some politicians (Grossman and Helpman, 
2002). It is usually claimed that firm’ owners or input providers may find it easier to overcome 
such free-riding problems than consumers, the latter being more atomized and having less at 
stake per capita in many policies. The same firms or groups of firms may find it easier to access 
some political parties than others, for geographic or historical reasons. In Spain, minority 
Catalan nationalist parties usually have a strong influence on Spanish governments when the 
Spanish government does not have an overall majority. In addition to this, the Socialist Party is 
usually the first party in Catalonia in general elections, whereas the Popular Party usually has a 
11
 small representation in this region. Besides, just some months before the March 2004 General 
Election, a new coalition autonomous government had been formed in Catalonia between the 
Socialist and two other left-wing parties, one of them nationalist. Hence it could be expected 
that investors in Catalan firms would benefit from a victory of the Socialist Party because 
Catalan firms could then have an easier access to central policy-makers. 
 
• Capture and agency. Agency problems in politics (voters not perfectly controlling 
politicians) and inside firms with dispersed shareholdings (shareholders not perfectly 
controlling managers) may be at the root of collusion episodes between politicians and 
managers (Trillas, 2004). In the case of Spain, the privatization of major firms selling the assets 
to a dispersed shareholding facilitated the appointment of managers close to the PP government 
(Bel and Trillas, 2005), something that a new Socialist government would possibly try to 
reverse.   
 
 
3. The joint impact of the election on all the firms in the sample 
 
By testing the hypothesis that the attacks and the election had a significant impact on all the 
companies in the sample, we are effectively testing whether the surprise election following the 
terror attacks had a significant effect on the stock market as a whole. 
 
In order to do this, we perform a Wald test to the dummy variables and bootstrap results when 
the variable results are significant due to over-rejection problems of the test in the SUR 
framework14. Now the Wald test is performed to the whole of the 87 companies included. Table 
2 reports the results, distinguishing between models M1 and M2 and on the event windows 
used.  
 
Table 2 
event window length 
(election effect)
4 days 5 days 6 days 4 days 5 days 6 days
Wald test 117.56 117.92 119.57 107.55 107.94 109.41
p-values 0.0162 0.0153 0.0118 0.0699 0.0637 0.0525
Bootstrap p-values - 0.2359 - - 0.3017 -
Wald test 116.40 97.33 102.14 115.17 97.97 97.96
p-values 0.0194 0.2106 0.1278 0.0233 0.1978 0.1982
Bootstrap p-values 0.2470 - - 0.3966 - -
Terror Attacks Effect
Election Effect
M1 M2
 
 
 
                                                 
14 As discussed in section 2.2, we then perform the bootstrap in the 5-day window case. 
12
 As inspection of Table 2 shows, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of no effect of the 
terror attacks across the different event windows. Nevertheless the bootstrap exercise in the 5-
day event window shows that there is no statistically significant effect of the terror attacks in the 
market as a whole. In the case of the election effect, the Wald test itself already does not reject 
the null hypothesis of no effect with its asymptotical critical values in 4 out of 6 cases. In order 
to confirm this result, we compute the bootstrap structure of the test in the other 2 cases, 
resulting in both cases in the confirmation of the no effect hypothesis of the election results in 
the stock market. As a whole, one would conclude that neither the terror attacks nor the election 
result affected the Spanish economy as a whole. That would reject partisanship and it would be 
consistent with convergence theories such as the median voter theorem.  
 
This methodology has not been used by other studies that test for the effect of political results 
on the stock market as a whole. Traditionally, these studies (see for example Vuchelen 2003) 
regressed a national stock market index with dummy variables for the dates in which there were 
political events. We also did this (and it is available upon request) with mixed results: the 
variable for the terror attacks was significant (more on this in Section 5) but not the variables 
including the effect of the election results. However, it is doubtful in statistical terms that one 
can infer any conclusions from such simple approach. More specifically, one cannot invoke a 
central limit theorem with 2 observations (in the case of the terror attacks). The randomness of 
the result is too high. 
 
 
Table 3 
 
event window length 
(election effect) 3 days 4 days 5 days
6 days 7 days 8 days 3 days 4 days 5 days 6 days 7 days 8 days
Wald test 195.62 138.73 97.21 99.30 105.23 116.89 238.31 157.79 104.29 109.64 111.82 129.31
p-values 0.000 0.000 0.213 0.173 0.089 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.099 0.059 0.037 0.002
Bootstrap p-values 0.0374 0.269 - - - 0.384 0.020 0.154 - - 0.465 0.231
M1 M2
Joint effects (2 pre-
election days +)
 
 
 
Table 3 shows that the joint effects of the attacks and the election were only significant if we 
take a very narrow event window (the three working days between the terror attacks on 
Thursday and the day after the election, and even in this case with border line significance). 
 
Nonetheless, as opposed to standard papers that test only for `macroeconomic partisanship´ in a 
country using this methodology, we also test for ´microeconomic partisanship´ and related 
hypotheses in the next section. 
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 4. Testing convergence versus partisan at the micro level, agency and capture 
theories using individual companies’ or industries’ expectations 
 
4.1. Partisan effects on industries 
 
Political partisanship implies that different parties have different visions about the priorities of 
the country and, in the equilibrium of the platform setting game, they run into the elections with 
different platforms, and the platform of the winning party is implemented. For example, a 
hypothetical partisan industrial policy of the Spanish Socialist party included restructuring the 
electricity market in Spain, attaining an industry with higher concentration and creating 
‘national champions’ in the electricity market, capable of competing in the European Energy 
Market, due to come into force in June 2007. We do not imply with this that PSOE favours 
‘national champions’ while PP does not. The partisan hypothesis is not about PSOE generally 
favouring ‘national champions’ and PP not15. It is specific to the electricity sector, as the PP 
Government had committed itself to keeping the number of companies in the electricity market, 
and had honoured the commitment by stopping any merger. The arrival of a PSOE government 
might have caused a change on the prospects of the sector, by making possible the completion 
of successful transactions in the market for corporate control.   
 
If this were the case, then again the political change in Spain on March 2004 would have caused 
abnormal returns on the electricity sector as a whole, as the effect of a prospective partisan 
policy of the socialist party in the electricity sector would have caused the returns to differ from 
zero, negatively or positively depending on the market’s estimate of this policy’s effects.  
 
We can test whether whole economic sectors are affected by partisan policies, much in the same 
way as it is done in Herron et al. (2000) for the American economy.16 Using the Wald test, we 
formulate for a number of industries in the Spanish economy the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
15 In fact, the PP Government (1996-2004) threatened to use its golden share to stop the merger of 
Telefónica with the Dutch company KPM. Bel and Trillas (2005) find evidence in this particular case that 
this Government’s veto was not driven by a will to protect Telefónica’s shareholders, but by the fear of 
losing its residual control over the company. 
 
16 We also test whether political change had a significant effect on each company separately. We perform 
the t-test on all companies included in the estimation (available upon request). Only 3 companies out of a 
sample of 87 have significant abnormal returns robust to the estimation with both M1 and M2 and the 
different size of the event windows: Iberpapel, a paper company, Endesa, and Red Eléctrica Española, the 
two latter ones both electricity companies. Endesa has in all the 6 cases negative abnormal returns at the 
1% confidence interval.  
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where si .....1= , and s  is the number of companies in a particular sector, while the gammas 
are the parameter coefficients related to the political change event window. 
 
We use the official industry division of the MCM Stock Exchange to test for the hypothesis that 
a particular sector was affected by the election results (see Appendix). Table 4 shows that the 
only economic industries in which the null hypothesis is rejected in all cases are the electricity 
and gas industries. In these industries, in 5 cases the null is rejected at the 1% confidence 
interval and in one case at the 5% confidence interval. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the winners had a partisan interest in changing the structure of the electricity and 
gas market. The bootstrap p-values in Table 7 (see below, Section 5) confirm these levels of 
significance of the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
 
The media industry is affected in 5 out of 6 cases, but only at the 10% confidence interval using 
the standard asymptotic critical values. Using the bootstrap p-values though, it is shown that 
using M1 the effects are statistically non-significant anymore, while using M2 they remain 
significant at the 10% confidence interval. Even though these results are weak, this result might 
express the fact that relevant companies in the industry such as Recoletos, Telecinco or Antena3 
where lacking data and could not be included in the regression model. Then only three 
companies were included, two of them closely related one to another (Prisa and Sogecable), and 
commonly considered to be supportive of the Socialist party.  
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 Table 4. Effect of the election results on specific industries: Wald test. 
H0: No effect of  the election results on the industry 
 
event window length 4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days
Oil NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Electricity and gas RHo*** RHo*** RHo** RHo*** RHo*** RHo***
Water and others - - - - - -
Minerals, metals and 
transformation of metal 
products NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Machinery goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo**
Construction NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo**
Construction materials NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Chemical industry - - - - - -
Engineering - - - - - -
Aerospacial - - - - - -
Food and beverages NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Clothes NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Paper and graphic arts NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* NoRHo NoRHo
Cars - - - - - -
Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Other consumption 
goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Tourism and 
entertainment NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Trade - - - - - -
Media RHo* RHo* RHo* RHo* RHo* NoRHo
Transport and 
distribution NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Highways and parkings NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Other services - - - - - -
Banking NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Insurance NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo*
Financial investment - - - - - -
Real Estate NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Telecommunications NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* NoRHo NoRHo
Electronics and 
software NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo** RHo* RHo***
Technological hardware - - - - - -
M1 M2
 
Note 1: RHo (Null Hypothesis is rejected). NoRHo (Null Hypothesis is not rejected) 
Note 2: When in some industry there are not at least two companies, Wald test is not performed 
Note 3: ***, 1% confidence interval; **, 5% confidence interval; *, 10% confidence interval. 
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 4.2. Testing agency and capture theories 
 
Any theory making predictions about the determinants of firm’s profits, be these regulatory 
policies, movements in the corporate control market, managerial or rivals’ decisions, etc., can be 
tested by a an event study, if the event is not anticipated. Partisan versus convergence theories 
are certainly not the only ones that can be tested. We focus here on the potential of this event 
study to shed light on capture and agency theories relating to the relationship between firms and 
politics in Spain. 
 
Elsewhere (see Bel and Trillas, 2005) it has been suggested that corporate governance in large 
Spanish firms give a lot of discretion to managers, and that they may take advantage of this 
great discretion by sharing rents with politicians in exchange for favours to political parties, in 
the form of appointing party cronies, funding media empires or supporting particular policies. In 
this case, an unexpected change in the ruling party implies a break in long term collusion 
contracts and possibly the signing of new contracts, for example by favouring the government 
the appointment of new managers through pressures over key shareholders.  
 
Agency problems may explain the fact that society is not fully able of controlling politicians, 
who can take decisions seeking particular and not general interests. Bel and Trillas (2005) find 
evidence consistent with collusion between the PP Government (1996-2004) and the managers 
of Telefónica, a telecommunications firm. Other state-owned companies where this type of 
collusion between managers and politicians could have happened where privatised as well 
during the PP government. We hypothesise that the new PSOE government intended to reverse 
this situation by promoting the replacement of managers in companies previously privatised by 
the PP. One of the possible ways of doing this is by promoting takeover bids over these 
companies. If this were the case, abnormal returns would have been experienced in these 
companies when the PSOE won the election, as this possibility would have been discounted by 
the market. 
 
The theory of capture (see Grossman and Helpman, 2002) might involve not only capture of the 
government by firms, but also other agents might find themselves in a position of influencing 
the government in a certain way. The theory of political coalitions (Riker, 1962) tries to explain 
the motivations of the political parties to engage themselves in a coalition. This coalition can 
have very different forms, ranging from ministerial involvement of the minority party to formal 
17
 agreements on policies that will be passed during the legislature.17 Bergman (1995) defines the 
general motivations of a party to form a coalition: ministries, policies, votes and cohesion. It is 
very common in many European countries, such as Norway, Finland, Sweden, Germany or 
Italy, to consistently have minority governments over time (Laver and Schofield, 1998). 
 
The Spanish political structure consists of two major political parties (PP and PSOE) and a 
certain number of smaller parties, generally regional and nationalist from Spanish historical 
regions. It happens rather often that the governing party, should not it have gained overall 
majority in the election, depends on the votes of these parties, generally Catalan nationalist 
parties (possibly among others), to rule. Given that PSOE did not obtain an overall majority, 
political prices might have been paid to Catalan parties, in this case favouring Catalan 
companies. If this were the case positive abnormal returns would have been obtained by Catalan 
companies from the prospect of a political coalition between PSOE and the Catalan nationalist 
parties. 
 
Hence, one hypothesis to test is that PSOE was favouring Catalan companies in order to satisfy 
the demands of Catalan parties supporting PSOE’s government. 
 
Looking at chart 1, it is clear that even though the PSOE won the election, it needed other 
parties to support the new government. In particular, CiU and ERC, two minority nationalist 
Catalan parties, and the third and fourth parties in the parliament in number of seats, were the 
most likely candidates for this role, and rapidly offered themselves to collaborate with the PSOE 
after the election. If the market expected that there was a chance that this alliance could 
materialise and implement policies in support of Catalan firms, the latter would have 
experienced positive abnormal returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Reniu (2001) notes that in exchange for the parliamentary support to the PSOE (1993-1996) and PP 
(1996-2000) governments, CiU, a minority nationalist Catalan party, obtained in the first case a very low 
profile opposition of PSC-PSOE in the regional parliament of Catalonia, while in the second case 
obtained the support of PP’s parliamentarians in the Catalan regional government.  
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 Figure 1. 2004 General election results. Seats in Parliament by political party 
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Then again, a Wald test suffices to test for this hypothesis: 
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Where si .....1=  is referred to all the Catalan companies. 
 
We identify Catalan companies as those companies in the sample having its headquarters in 
Catalonia. 12 out of 87 are Catalan companies according to this criterion: Abertis, Agbar, Banc 
Sabadell, Catalana-Occidente, Colonial, DOGI, Ercros, GN, Mecalux, Miquel i Costas, Seda 
Barna and Service Point. The Wald tests on the three event windows and with the 2 different 
models described above, as shown in Table 4, do not reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns in any case. It follows that the hypothesis is rejected by the data. 
 
Another hypothesis to be tested that combines agency problems (between voters and politicians, 
and between shareholders and managers) and capture (in the form of collusion between 
politicians and managers), is that the new government wanted to promote the replacement of 
CEOs appointed by the former PP government in key strategic sectors privatised during the PP 
years. 
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 If this were the case, then abnormal returns would have occurred in these companies as the 
expectation of a potential change in the management of these companies would have produced 
significant movements in the returns.  
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where si .....1=  stands for companies privatised under the PP period and assumed to be under 
the control of this party. 
 
Six companies were privatised during the PP period in government: Telefónica (which 
afterwards spun-off Telefónica móviles), Argentaria (which became after a merger BBVA), 
Iberia, Altadis, Endesa and Repsol. The Wald tests reject the null hypothesis of no effect on the 
group of companies as a whole at the 1% confidence interval in all cases (Table 5). The 
bootstrapped p-values confirm these levels of significance (see Table 7 below, in Section 5). 
 
Table 5. Effect of the election results on Catalan companies and companies formerly privatised 
by the PP government: Wald tests. 
event window length 4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days
Hypothesis 3: Catalan companies 0.422304 0.458308 0.464842 0.655269 0.591586 0.776163
Hypothesis 4: PP privatized companies 4,186278*** 4,111859*** 2,771734*** 4,678475*** 4,249329*** 3,392266***
M1 M2
Note: ***, 1% confidence interval; **, 5% confidence interval; *, 10% confidence interval 
 
Therefore, the results do not reject the hypothesis of collusive and agency problems as the 
election results had a significantly different from zero impact on this group of companies. 
 
 
5. A remark on the effects of the terror attacks 
 
The terror attacks in Madrid on March 11 2004 had a potential double effect in the economy. 
First, the attacks might have directly affected certain industries. Second, the attacks might have 
had the effect of increasing the probability of PSOE winning the election, and therefore if any 
company or group of companies were affected (positively or negatively) by the change of 
government, the effect of the terror attacks on their returns would have been different from zero. 
This is why in our model we used two different event windows (one for the terror attacks, 
another for the election results), in order to avoid considering as consequences of the election 
results something that was directly related to the attacks themselves. In this short section, we 
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 want to show this double effect of the attacks with an example of its effect on specific 
industries. Table 6 presents the effects of the attacks by industry as in Table 4. Table 7 presents 
the bootstrapped p-values for those industries where the null hypothesis of no effect of the terror 
attacks is rejected robustly. 
 
 
Table 6. Effect of the terror attacks on industries: Wald test 
H0: No effect of the terror attacks on the industry 
 
event window length 4-days 5-days 6-days 4-days 5-days 6-days
Oil NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo**
Electricity and gas RHo** RHo** RHo** RHo*** RHo*** RHo***
Water and others - - - - - -
Minerals, metals and 
transformation of metal 
products RHo** RHo** RHo** RHo*** RHo*** RHo***
Machinery goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Construction - - - - - -
Construction materials NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo*
Chemical industry - - - - - -
Engineering - - - - - -
Aerospacial - - - - - -
Food and beverages NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo**
Clothes NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Paper and graphic arts NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Cars - - - - - -
Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Other consumption 
goods NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo*
Tourism and 
entertainment RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo*** RHo***
Trade - - - - - -
Media NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Transport and 
distribution NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo** RHo** RHo**
Highways and parkings NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Other services - - - - - -
Banking NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Insurance NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Financial investment - - - - - -
Real Estate NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Telecommunications NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo RHo* RHo* RHo*
Electronics and 
software NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo NoRHo
Technological hardware - - - - - -
M1 M2
 
Note 1: RHo (Null Hypothesis is rejected). NoRHo (Null Hypothesis is not rejected) 
Note 2: When in some industry there are not at least two companies, Wald test is not performed 
Note 3: ***, 1% confidence interval; **, 5% confidence interval; *, 10% confidence interval 
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 Three industries are robustly affected by the (two-day event window combined with four, five 
or six-days event windows for the election event) terror attacks: Tourism and entertainment, 
Minerals, metals and transformation of metal products and Electricity and gas. As shown in 
Table 2 the only of these three industries affected by the election result was Electricity and gas. 
Results reported in Table 4 suggest that while the two former sectors were genuinely affected by 
the attacks themselves, the effect on the Electricity and gas sector was more likely to be related 
with the variation in the likely winner of the election that were being held three days after the 
attacks occurred. This is consistent with results discussed above. 
 
Table 7 shows Bootstrapped p-values obtained from the 5-days election results event window 
model, compared to the p-values of the Wald test 
 
Table 7. Bootstrapped p-values 
 
Wald Bootstrap Wald Bootstrap
Media 0,099 0,119 0,079 0,086
Electronics - - 0,095 0,106
Electricity 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,002
PP privatised companies 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,004
Insurance - - 0,070 0,112
Electricity 0,042 0,091 0,002 0,022
Minerals 0,031 0,058 0,004 0,023
Construction materials - - 0,067 0,113
Food and beverages - - 0,048 0,101
Other consumption goods - - 0,071 0,092
Tourism and entertainment 0,005 0,030 0,000 0,007
Transport and distribution - - 0,021 0,043
Telecommunications - - 0,086 0,118
El
ec
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6. Conclusions  
 
This study shows that the forces of political convergence are quite strong. Political rhetoric in 
Spain is acrimonious, and memories of the 1936-1939 Century Civil War and the 1939-1975 
General Franco´s Dictatorship are (and have increasingly been in the recent past) commonly 
used in the political debate. However, shareholders of quoted firms seem on average quite 
indifferent between political parties.  
 
Post-election political evolution confirms that macro-economic policy has not been the main 
political cleavage between right and left in Spain. Although Prime Minister Zapatero was 
portrayed by the opposition as the most radical Prime Minister in Spanish democratic history, 
22
 the Finance Minister between 2004 and 2008 was Pedro Solbes, a former EU Commissioner 
committed with fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability, who had also been Finance 
Minister in the González governments of the early 1990’s, when Spain applied for membership 
in the Euro area. The opposition focused on nationalist tensions as the main political issue, and 
it concentrated on economic issues only18 on occasion of the takeover of the electricity firm 
Endesa and similar matters related to corporate control and regulatory institutions (mainly 
microeconomic issues19). 
 
The overall results we obtain are consistent with no partisanship in macro terms (so no effect on 
expected macro policies such as fiscal policy, inflation, public expenditure or unemployment 
policies that may affect the market as a whole) but partisanship in micro terms (so for particular 
industries that may be affected by the political structure of Spain and its business-politicians 
networks). Taking the same (4, 5 and 6 days) event windows, we find a significant impact of 
elections on two groups of companies and no significant impact on the market as a whole. 
 
A small number of companies were indeed affected by the election result analyzed in this 
article, but these exceptions seem more related to political capture than to the ideological 
contour of policies. We conjecture (and presented some statistical evidence consistent with it) 
that firms in the energy industry were vulnerable to movements in the market for corporate 
control aimed at removing managers appointed in the privatization process leaded by the 
previous government. Firms in the media sector may reflect a structure characterized by a 
strongly partisan nature.  
 
Parties may indeed diverge in non-economic policy dimensions, such as social, religious and 
cultural norms, foreign policy, or the degree of institutional decentralization (for example, they 
bitterly fight over how to put an end to violence in the Basque Country). But the profit 
expectations of the vast majority of quoted firms are unaffected. 
 
Our exercise is based on the event study methodology, which depends on market expectations 
and, in particular, the results are meaningful only to the extent that the semi-strong version of 
the efficient financial markets hypothesis holds. Besides, partisan macro-economic effects could 
have an impact on agents that are not the investors in quoted firms, but workers, consumers, or 
                                                 
18 In the 2008 general election campaign economic conditions became an issue. In this case, the PP 
opposition was trying to blame government for slowing economic growth; macroeconomic platform 
differences, however, remained difficult to spot. 
 
19 However, in February 2007 the two main political parties were reaching an agreement on takeover and 
competition policy legislations. 
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 investors in other firms. Finally, the events could have an impact on stock market volatility, 
something we aim at exploring in future research20. With the quantitative evidence gathered so 
far, however, we find that investors in quoted firms in general are not significantly affected by 
partisan policies. Differences over economic policies between right and left vary over time and 
across countries; in 2004 in a Euro-area country such as Spain, there is no clear and robust 
evidence of significant differences. If there were any differences these were limited to a few 
microeconomic policies. 
                                                 
20 We estimated a GARCH (1, 1) on the returns of the IBEX-35 and found some weak evidence of impact 
on the volatility of the whole market caused by the terror attacks. The terror attacks had a positive and 
significant effect on the volatility while the election results had a positive but non-significant effect. 
However and as previously discussed in section 3, it is statistically doubtful one can extract conclusions 
from such a procedure where a Central Limit theorem is invoked with 2 and 5 observations. 
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Companies grouped by industries 
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